Public response to the 2014 chemical spill in West Virginia: knowledge, opinions and behaviours by Savoia, Elena et al.
Public response to the 2014
chemical spill in West Virginia:
knowledge, opinions and behaviours
The Harvard community has made this
article openly available.  Please share  how
this access benefits you. Your story matters
Citation Savoia, Elena, Michael A. Stoto, Rahul Gupta, Nasandra Wright,
and Kasisomayajula Viswanath. 2015. “Public response to
the 2014 chemical spill in West Virginia: knowledge, opinions
and behaviours.” BMC Public Health 15 (1): 790. doi:10.1186/
s12889-015-2134-2. http://dx.doi.org/10.1186/s12889-015-2134-2.
Published Version doi:10.1186/s12889-015-2134-2
Citable link http://nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:21459651
Terms of Use This article was downloaded from Harvard University’s DASH
repository, and is made available under the terms and conditions
applicable to Other Posted Material, as set forth at http://
nrs.harvard.edu/urn-3:HUL.InstRepos:dash.current.terms-of-
use#LAA
RESEARCH ARTICLE Open Access
Public response to the 2014 chemical spill
in West Virginia: knowledge, opinions and
behaviours
Elena Savoia1*, Michael A. Stoto2, Rahul Gupta3, Nasandra Wright4 and Kasisomayajula Viswanath5
Abstract
Background: On January 9th 2014, a faulty storage tank leaked 10,000 gal of an industrial coal processing liquid
into the Elk River in West Virginia (WV), contaminating the drinking water of the nine counties collectively known as
the Kanawha Valley. The aim of this study was to 1) explore how and when people obtained information about the
water contamination and 2) understand how individual and social factors such as socio-demographic characteristics,
timing of information, trust in government, and risk perception influenced compliance with recommended behaviours
and the public’s views on the need for environmental regulations.
Methods: Between February 7–26, 2014, a survey was conducted of adult residents of West Virginia including
geographic areas affected and non-affected by the chemical spill. The total population-based sample size was
690 and the survey was administered online. Descriptive statistics and multivariate statistical models were created
to determine what factors influenced compliance and public opinions.
Results: Findings from this study show that, during the 2014 West Virginia water crisis, information about water
contamination spread quickly, as 73 % of survey respondents across the state and 89 % within the affected counties
reported they heard about the incident the same day it occurred. Most people received the information promptly,
understood what happened, and understood what to do to prevent exposure to the contaminant. The majority of
respondents living in affected counties (70 %) followed the recommended behaviours. Among participants who voiced
an opinion on the role of government in environmental regulations, the majority of respondents (54 %) reported there
is “too little regulation.”
Conclusion: Data from this study show that a higher perception of risk and timely receipt of information are associated
with compliance with recommended behaviours, underlying the importance of releasing information to the public as
quickly as possible during a crisis. This study also highlights the importance of coordinating risk communication
activities beyond the area of the incident to assure public understanding of what measures are recommended,
which are not and where.
Background
On January 9th 2014, a faulty storage tank leaked 10,000 gal
of an industrial coal processing liquid into the Elk River in
West Virginia (WV); the leak occurred upstream the main
source of water for the company serving drinking water to
the residents of nine counties collectively known as the
Kanawha Valley. In the United States, chemicals have rarely
been associated with waterborne disease outbreaks, for
this reason the West Virginia water crisis can be described
as a unique and interesting incident [1]. The January 2014
chemical contamination of the Elk River in West Virginia
(WV) disrupted public water supply to thousands of
homes, caused the closure of schools and businesses, and
as a result, hundreds of people reported symptoms they
associated with exposure to the contaminated water.
On January 9th, during the course of the day, state and
local officials received several complaints of a licorice odor
in the air and taste in the water due to the presence of the
chemical [2–4]. At 6 pm the day of the leak, Governor
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Earl Ray Tomblin appeared on television and issued a “Do
Not Use” order that was unprecedented in scale or scope.
As a result, approximately 300,000 residents (16 % of the
population of West Virginia), living in the nine counties
affected by the spill, were told that their tap water was not
safe for “drinking cooking, washing, or bathing” and to be
aware of signs and symptoms of exposure to the chemical
such as rashes, nausea, vomiting, and wheezing [5]. Besides
local television news, state and local officials used many
other channels of communication, including radio, social
media and town halls. A description of the timeline of the
response and specific challenges experienced by the re-
sponders in coordinating communication efforts have been
described elsewhere [6].
At the time of the incident, very little toxicological infor-
mation was available on the main chemical contained in
the liquid: 4 -methylcyclohexane methanol (crude MCHM).
According to the producer, MCHM is harmful if swallowed,
causes skin and eye irritation, and at elevated temperatures
can cause irritation of the eyes and respiratory tract [7]. Po-
tential carcinogenic effects were investigated after the
incident showing DNA damage and need for further
carcinogenic evaluations [8].
In the week following the spill the water distribution
system was flushed and residents of the affected areas
were advised to flush their plumbing systems using a
stepwise protocol [9]. However, after the “Do Not Use”
order was lifted the odor remained and questions about
the health effects of MCHM persisted [6].
The cultural, political, and economic context of the
Kanawha Valley created a unique case in which to study
the population’s exposure to information, their knowledge,
behaviours and reactions to this emergency. For nearly a
century, the Kanawha Valley has been home to the largest
concentration of chemical plants in the United States [10].
Valley residents are not unfamiliar with the risk of chem-
ical spills, environmental agencies receive several calls on
a weekly basis on potential spills from industries working
in the area, [6] but in this circumstance little was known
about the health risks of the chemical product that spilled
in the water and the persistent odor and taste generated
concern in the population. For decades, residents in the
valley have participated in long running debates over
environmental oversight of the coal and chemical indus-
tries, the foundation of West Virginia’s economy.
In times of low risk as well as in times of emergencies,
in West Virginia as well as in any other area, information
about the potential threat of chemicals or pollutants circu-
lates widely from both official and unofficial sources and
exposure to circulating information may influence or not
behaviours [11]. Under conditions of uncertainty on the
extent of exposure to a particular product and its impact
on health, risk communication becomes a challenging
dynamic process [12] in which the public has a myriad of
opportunities to seek, assimilate, and act or do not act on
the information received and to accept or contest official
opinion and advice [13]. More specifically, during large
scale emergencies, several studies have shown that risk
communication may fail to reach intended communities
particularly those most at risk [11–17].
The aim of this study is to 1) explore how and when
people obtained information about the water contamin-
ation and 2) understand how individual and social factors
such as socio-demographic characteristics, timing of infor-
mation, trust in government, and risk perception influenced
compliance with recommended behaviours and the public’s
views on the need for environmental regulations.
Methods
Between February 7–26, 2014, a survey was conducted of
adult residents of West Virginia including geographic areas
affected and non-affected by the chemical spill. The total
population-based sample size was 690; 145 respondents
were drawn from the local sample of Knowledge Networks’
KnowledgePanel®, a survey system with an address-based
sample frame that provides non-Internet capable house-
holds with a laptop computer and free Internet access. The
remaining participants (545) were recruited solely for the
purpose of this survey (opt-in-panel), using the Knowledge-
Panel calibration technique [17] with an over-sample of
residents of low socio-economic position (SEP). Base
weights and panel post-stratification weights were included
with the sampling technique. We sought to oversample
individuals with low SEP so we would have a large enough
sample to identify potential barriers in receiving and under-
standing public health messages due to low literacy levels
and/or limited access to some channels of communication.
Participants were eligible to win prizes drawn through
monthly sweepstakes.
Survey design
The questions for this survey were adapted from a sur-
vey implemented in the aftermath of the 2010 Boston
Water Crisis [18] and from polls conducted by Gallup®
[19]. The survey covered knowledge and adoption of
preventive behaviours, perception of risk, use of infor-
mation channels, and the public’s views and reactions on
the role of government. Pilot testing of the survey was
conducted on 45 individuals prior to its fielding. The
study was approved by the Harvard T.H. Chan Institu-
tional Review Board (IRB).
Measures
Independent variables
Independent variables were originally selected on the
basis of substantive and theoretical relevance in accordance
with the “Structural Influence Model of Communication in
Public Health Emergency Preparedness” [11–16, 18].
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This heuristic model focuses on the role of communication
in explaining the relationship between social determinants
and health outcomes, and has been successfully used to
examine communications during the 2010 Boston water
crisis [18]. Six types of independent variables were
included: area of residence (living or not in one of the
affected counties),1 social determinants (education, income,
savings), perceived risk, trust in government, whether and
when the respondent learned about the emergency and
demographic variables (gender, age). More details on how
each variable was defined and categorized are provided in
Table 1.
Dependent variables
A scoring system was devised to create two dependent
variables: 1) compliance with recommended behaviours
and 2) views on government’s role and priorities. To
measure compliance with recommended behaviours, re-
sponses to the following question were analyzed: In re-
sponse to news reports of the water crisis, did you do
any of the following? The response options included
recommended and, non-recommended behaviours listed
in Table 1. Based on these responses we created a count
variable ranging from 0 (did not follow any recommended
behaviour, followed a non- recommended behaviour or
Table 1 Definition of variables
Age a) 18–29, b) 30–44, c) 45–59 and d) ≥ 60
Education a) < high school, b) high school, c) some college and d) bachelor degree
or higher
Household income in the past 12 months a)≤ $14,999, b) $15,000–$34,999, c) $35,000–$59,999, d) $60,000–$99,999
and e)≥ $100,000.
Savings - If you lost your current source of income (your paycheck, public
assistance, or other forms of income) how long could you continue to live at
your current address and standard of living?
a) 0 = less than 2 months, b) 1 = 3 months-one year and c) 2 =more than
one year.
Timeliness of information - When did you first learn about the water crisis? a)1 = the same day the water contamination was reported (Thursday
January 9) = 1 b) one or more days after =0.
Perceived risk -To the best of your knowledge, how likely was it for someone
who lived in the affected areas to get sick by drinking tap water during the
water crisis?
a) 0 = very unlikely or unlikely, b) 1 = somewhat likely and c) 2 = very
likely.
Trust in government -Would you say that the government generally is? a) 0 = run by few people looking for their own interests and b) 1 = run for
the benefit of all.
Knowledge of recommended behaviors -To the best of your knowledge
what actions were recommended in the areas affected by the water crisis?
This question had correct response options describing recommended
behaviors (e.g. drinking bottled water, avoiding drinking tap water,
avoiding taking showers or bathing with tap water, avoiding using tap
water to prepare baby formula) and non-correct options recommended
behaviors (e.g. drinking water only after boiling it, drinking filtered tap
water, cooking with boiled or disinfected water, washing dishes with
boiled or disinfected water and brushing teeth with boiled or disinfected
water).
a) 1 = the respondent checked at least one recommended behavior and
did not check any non-recommended behavior b) 0 = the respondent
did not check any of the recommended behaviors or checked at least
one non-recommended behavior.
Behavioral Compliance a)Recommended behaviors (e.g. drank only bottled water, cooked with
only bottled water, washed dishes with only bottled water, brushed teeth
with only bottled water, avoided taking showers or bathing with tap
water, avoided tap water from coming in contact with skin, avoided
using tap water for washing clothes),
b)Non-recommended behaviors (e.g. drank water after boiling it, cooked
with only boiled or disinfected water, washed dishes with only boiled or
disinfected water, brushed teeth only with boiled or disinfected water),
and
c)Non-recommended behaviors geographically specific to affected
counties (drank tap water and followed no recommended behavior).
1 = the respondent checked at least one recommended behavior and did
not check any non-recommended behavior or 0 = the respondent did
not check any of the recommended behaviors or checked at least one
non-recommended behavior.
Flushing compliance: After learning the water crisis was over, did you
flush a) cold water faucets for at least 5 min?, b) warm water faucets for
at least 15 min?, c) appliances (i.e. ice maker, dish washer). Answer
options to this question were Yes/No.
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followed a combination of recommended and not recom-
mended behaviours) to 1–7 (maximum number of recom-
mended behaviours).
Once the water was determined to be appropriate for
use, people in the affected counties were recommended
to flush faucets and appliances to eliminate any residual
contaminants. Compliance with this procedure was
assessed through responses to three questions as de-
scribed in Table 1.
To measure opinion on government’s role and prior-
ities, two variables were generated using data from the
following questions: 1) In general do you think there is
too much, too little, or about the right amount of gov-
ernment regulation on the environment? and 2) Do you
think it should be a high, medium or low priority for the
government to regulate the way major chemical and
coal industries do business or the government should
not address this issue? Separate ordinal variables were
created where responses were coded as 0 = too much,
1 = right amount and 2 = too little and 0 = government
should not address this issue or it should be a low pri-
ority, 1 = a medium priority and 2 = a high priority.
Statistical analyses
Study specific post stratification weights based on gen-
der, age, metropolitan area, race/ethnicity, education
and income were created using the most recent Census
Bureau Current Population Survey to adjust for non-
coverage and non-response biases. Descriptive statistics
were calculated showing the frequency of both the
dependent and independent variables. For count variables,
negative binomial regression was used in bivariate and
multivariate models after rejecting the hypothesis of
equivalence in the mean and variance of the count. For
ordinal variables, ordered logistic regression was ap-
plied using Stata’s ologit command and the parallel regres-
sion assumption was tested by means of the Brant test
when needed. In all analyses study specific weights
were included to test for bivariate associations be-
tween each predictor and the two dependent variables.
A P-value of ≤ 0.25 was used as a cut-off to include the
variables in the model. In doing so, the following vari-
ables were dropped from the multivariate analysis of
compliance: age, gender, education, savings, and trust
in government. For the analysis of opinions on the role
of government in regulating the environment the fol-
lowing variables were dropped: education and savings.
Interactions were tested between area of residence
(within or outside the nine affected counties) and the
two following variables: timeliness of information and
knowledge of recommended behaviours. Analyses
were performed using Stata statistical software, release
13, College Station, TX.
Results
Sample characteristics
The overall response rate was 86 %, with 592 individuals of
the 690 sampled beginning the survey. Of these, 464 (67 %
of the original sample) completed the entire survey, and
their responses were included in the final analyses. Of the
464 respondents, 129 (27.8 %) lived in one of the nine
counties affected by the crisis, while the remaining 335
(72.1 %) lived in West Virginia but outside the affected
counties. Data from respondents from all counties were
analyzed and differences were investigated between respon-
dents from the affected areas and the rest of the state. The
proportion of respondents living in the affected counties
did not vary between the KnowledgePanel® and opt-in panel
subsamples (27 % versus 28 %). Socio-demographic char-
acteristics of those living in and outside the affected coun-
ties are shown in Table 2. The raw data (before weighting)
show that the subsample of people living in the affected
counties have a higher level of education compared to
those living outside this area, but between the two groups
there were no statistically significant differences in any of
the socio-demographic variables including education. Des-
pite intentional oversampling in the opt-in sample, when
the sample characteristics were compared to the Census
data our sample was found to underrepresent the category
of educational level “less than high school.”
Risk perception
Fifty-six percent of respondents reported that “getting
sick from drinking tap water” was very likely, with no
difference between those living in the affected counties
and those living outside this area (50 % and 58 %
respectively Binomial P-value > 0.05). Respondents who
reported a household income greater than $100,000
were the least likely to think that drinking tap water
would cause sickness when compared to respondents in
lower income categories. For example, those reporting
an income of < $15,000 were twice as likely to report
drinking water as risky compared to those with an
income of > $100,000 (OR = 2.37, 95 % C.I. 1.07–5.22).
Similarly, respondents who reported they could not
afford their current standard of living for more than two
months if income was lost were almost twice as likely
(OR = 1.9, 95 % C.I. 1.3–3.05) to think that drinking the
water would cause sickness compared to respondents
that could afford their standard of living for over a year.
Most of the respondents (56 %) agreed or strongly
agreed with the following statement: “Chemical or oil
spills in the water are happening all the time every day”.
Timeliness of information
Seventy-three percent of respondents answered that they
heard about the water crisis on the same day the water
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contamination was reported (January 9). The cumulative
percentages of those who heard about the crisis rose to
93 % by January 10, and 100 % by January 12. People liv-
ing in the affected counties were 3.7 times more likely to
have heard the news on the day the spill occurred com-
pared to people living outside this area [OR = 3.7 95 %
C.I. 1.9–7.2].
Source of information
Independently of when they received the news, most
people (70 %) first heard about the spill from local TV.
The Internet, family, friends and co-workers were the
sources of information more frequently reported as first
source the news was heard from. See Fig. 1 for a descrip-
tion of source of information by date the information
was received.
Trust in government
When asked the question “Would you say that the govern-
ment generally is …?” 77 % of respondents agreed with the
statement “Run by few people looking for their own inter-
ests.” This percentage ranged from 86 % for those living in
the affected counties to 75 % for those living outside this
area; 14 % agreed with the statement “Run for the benefit
of all” (10 % in the affected counties and 16 % outside this
area) and 8 % checked the option “Other, please specify”.
Among this 8 %, the majority (65 %) reported a negative
comment denoting a lack of trust, such as “Run for the
benefit of large lobby groups” or “ineffective,” while 22 %
reported mixed opinions such as “half and half” or “not
all one category,” and 13 % were unsure. Trust in govern-
ment was subsequently used as an independent variable in
the multivariate models.
Knowledge of recommended behaviours
The percentage of respondents who did not know about
any recommended behaviour was low among residents
of the nine affected counties; 89 % of them were able to
report at least one recommended behaviour. In terms of
non-recommended behaviours, “washing dishes with
boiled or disinfected water” was the most frequently
Table 2 Sample characteristics versus U.S. Census Bureau (American Community Survey 2009–2013)
Variable Total sample n (%) Census Living in the affected
counties n (%)
Census Living outside the affected
counties n (%)
Census
Gender (n = 464)
Male 220 (47.4) 49 % 58 (44.6) 49 % 161 (48.3) 49 %
Female 244 (52.6) 51 % 71 (55.4) 51 % 173 (51.7) 51 %
Age (n = 463)
18–24 29 (6.3) 6 % [20–24] 9 (7.0) 6 % [20–24] 20 (6.0) 7 % [20–24]
25–34 69 (14.9) 12 % 17 (13.2) 12 % 52 (15.5) 12 %
35–44 63 (13.6) 13 % 22 (17.1) 13 % 41 (12.3) 13 %
45–54 106 (22.8) 15 % 27 (20.9) 15 % 79 (23.7) 15 %
55–64 129 (27.8) 14 % 36 (27.9) 8 % 93 (27.8) 17 %
65–74 57 (12.3) 9 % 17 (13.1) 16 % 40 (12.0) 7 %
75+ 10 (2.2) 7 % 1 (0.8) 7 % 9 (2.7) 7 %
Education
(n = 463) 33 (7.2) 17 % 7 (5.2) 16 % 26 (7.9) 17 %
< High school 221 (47.7) 41 % 47 (36.4) 39 % 172 (51.5) 42 %
High school 104 (22.5) 24 % 38 (29.6) 25 % 67 (20.1) 24 %
Some college
Bachelor or more
105 (22.6) 18 % 37 (28.8) 20 % 69 (20.5) 17 %
Income (n = 450)
<$10,000 26 (5.6) 10 % 7 (5.4) 10 % 19 (5.9) 10 %
$10,000–$24,999 48 (10.4) 22 % 19 (14.7) 23 % 29 (9.0) 22 %
$25,000–$49.999 124 (26.7) 27 % 29 (22.5) 28 % 95 (29.3) 26 %
$50,000–$74.999 98 (21.1) 18 % 25 (19.4) 12 % 73 (22.5) 20 %
$75,000–$99.999 82 (17.7) 10 % 22 (17.1) 12 % 60 (18.5) 10 %
$100,000–$199,999 63(13.6)[$100,000–$174,999] 11 % 21(16.3)[$100,000–$174,999] 12 % 42(13.0)[$100,000–$174,999] 10 %
>$200,000 9 (1.9) 2 % 3 (2.3) 3 % 6 (1.8) 2 %
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reported, with 9 % of residents in the affected counties
and 20 % of residents in the non-affected counties
reporting it as a beneficial action. Other behaviours in-
correctly identified as “recommended” include: brushing
teeth with boiled or disinfected water (7 % affected and
18 % non-affected counties), cooking with boiled or dis-
infected water (6 % affected and 17 % non-affected
counties), and drinking water after boiling it (2 % af-
fected and 4 % non-affected counties). Knowledge of
recommended behaviours was not associated with any of
the socio-demographic factors, area of residence, or any
other independent variables listed above.
Compliance with recommended behaviours
The main recommendation was to abstain from drinking
tap water, and 69 % of respondents living in the affected
counties complied. There was a positive association be-
tween compliance with this recommended behaviour
and perception of risk, measured as the belief that
drinking the tap water will cause sickness [Pearson chi-
squared p-value = 0.02]. Overall, 74 % of respondents liv-
ing in the affected counties were compliant with at least
one preventive measure. People living in an affected
county were 5.7 times more likely to follow a recom-
mended behaviour than those living outside this area
[95 % C.I. 3.8–8.6]. Interestingly, outside the affected
counties 22 % of respondents followed at least one of the
recommended measures, even though not necessary. Resi-
dents who received information the same day the emer-
gency occurred were 2.3 times more likely to follow a
recommended behaviour [OR = 2.3 95 % C.I. 1.2–4.5].
Similarly, people reporting a belief that drinking tap water
in the affected areas was very likely to cause sickness were
2.4 times more likely to follow a recommended behaviour
[OR = 2.4 95 % C.I. 1.1–5] when compared to those who
thought that it was unlikely or very unlikely to make
people sick. See Table 3.
In the affected counties, the recommended procedure
to flush cold water faucets for 5 min was followed by
Fig. 1 Percentage of respondents hearing about the water crisis: first source of information and date
Table 3 Determinants of behavioral compliance
Independent Variables Single Predictors Models Ordinal Logistic Regression Models
IRR (95 % C.I.) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Living in the affected counties 5.8 [3.9–8.5] 6 [4–9] 6 [4–9.2] 5.7 [3.8–8.6]
Income
$15,000–$34,999 vs < $15,000 0.7 [0.3–1.1] 0.8 [0.3–1.9] 0.8 [0.4–1.7] 0.8 [0.4–1.6]
$35,000–$59,999 vs < $15,000 0.6 [0.3–1.1] 0.5 [0.2–1.2] 0.6 [0.3–1.3] 0.6 [0.3–1.4]
$60,000–$100,000 vs < $15,000 0.8 [0.4–1.4] 0.7 [0.3–1.5] 0.8 [0.3–1.7] 0.8 [0.4–1.7]
>$100,000 vs < $15,000 0.6 [0.3–1.2] 0.4 [0.2–1.1] 0.5 [0.2–1.3] 0.5 [0.2–1.2]
Timing of information 2.8 [1.4–5.5] 2.3 [1.2–4.6] 2.3 [1.2–4.5]
Risk perception
•Somewhat likely versus unlikely or very unlikely 1.3 [0.7–2.5] 1.1 [0.5–2.5] 1.2 [0.5–2.5]
•Very likely versus unlikely or very unlikely 2 [1.1–3.7] 2.3 [1.1–4.8] 2.4 [1.1–5]
Knowledge of recommended behaviors 1.8 [1–3.2]
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86 % of respondents, flushing warm water faucets by
68 %, and flushing appliances by 90 %. Outside the af-
fected areas, 14 % of respondents flushed their cold and
warm water faucets and 37 % flushed their appliances.
Views on government’s role and priorities
Among participants who voiced an opinion on the role
of government in regulating the environment (82 %), the
majority of them (54 %) reported there is “too little regu-
lation.” This percentage was much higher among those
living in the affected counties (74 %) compared to those
living outside this area (48 %). Twenty percent of all re-
spondents reported that the amount of regulation is ad-
equate (11 % in affected counties and 26 % outside), and
23 % said there is too much regulation (15 % in affected
counties and 26 % outside).
The multivariate analysis (Table 4) shows that re-
spondents in the affected counties were 2.6 times more
likely [OR = 2.6 95 % C.I. 1.5–4.5] to think that there is
too little government regulation when compared to re-
spondents living outside this area. Gender was also as-
sociated with this opinion, with women being 1.9 times
more likely [OR = 1.9 95 % C.I. 1.2–2.9] to think there
is too little regulation when compared to men. Similarly,
higher risk perception was associated with this opin-
ion. People reporting the highest category of risk per-
ception (very likely to get sick if drinking tap water) in
the affected areas were 2.4 times more likely [OR = 2.4
95 % C.I. 1.2–5.1] to think there is too little regulation
compared to those that believed it was unlikely or very
unlikely they would get sick from drinking the tap
water.
When respondents were asked their opinion on whether
regulating major chemical and coal industries should
be a high, medium, or low priority for government,
the majority (55 %) reported that it should be a high
priority, 31 % reported it should be a medium priority,
6 % a low priority and 7 % that the government should
not address this issue. Finally, respondents were asked
how much they agreed or disagreed with the following
statement “In this region chemical or oil spills are an
acceptable compromise to have a job”. The majority
(57 %) reported they disagreed or strongly disagreed
with this statement independently of their area of
residence.
Discussion
Findings from this study show that, during the 2014
West Virginia water crisis, information about water con-
tamination spread quickly, as 73 % of survey respon-
dents across the state and 89 % within the affected
counties reported they heard about the incident the
same day it occurred. Most people received the informa-
tion promptly, understood what happened, and under-
stood what to do to prevent exposure to the contaminant.
The majority of respondents living in the affected counties
(694 %) were compliant with the main recommendation
of abstaining from drinking the tap water. Thirty-seven
percent living outside this area also avoided drinking the
tap water during the crisis even if not recommended, one
possibility explaining this action could be a belief that the
contaminant will eventually reach the water supply of
other communities and highlight a need for coordinating
risk communication activities beyond solely affected areas.
Table 4 Determinants of opinion on the existing amount of government regulations on the environment (too little, right amount,
too much)
Independent Variables Single Predictor Models Multiple Negative Binomial Regression Models
OR (95 % C.I.) Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Living in the affected counties 3.4 [1.5–5] 2.8 [1.7–4.6] 2.9 [1.7–4.7] 2.6 [1.5–4.5]
Gender 1.8 [1.1–2.9] 1.9 [1.2–2.9] 1.8 [1.2–2.9] 1.9 [1.2–2.9]
Income
$15,000–$34,999 vs < $15,000 0.3 [0.2–1.6] 0.5 [0.2–1.3] 0.4 [0.2–1.1] 0.4 [0.2–1.1]
$35,000–$59,999 vs < $15,000 0.6 [0.3–1.5] 0.8 [0.3–1.8] 0.7 [0.3–1.6] 0.7 [0.3–1.6]
$60,000–$100,000 vs < $15,000 0.5 [0.2–1.3] 0.6 [0.3–1.4] 0.6 [0.2–1.3] 0.5 [0.2–1.2]
>$100,000 vs < $15,000 0.4 [0.2–1.1] 0.4 [0.2–1] 0.4 [0.2–1] 0.4 [0.2–1.1]
Timing of information 0.7 [0.4–1.2] 0.7 [0.4–1.2] 0.8 [0.5–1.3]
Risk perception
•Somewhat likely versus unlikely or very unlikely 2.7 [1.2–6.1] 1.8 [0.9–3.6] 1.9 [0.9–4.2]
•Very likely versus unlikely or very unlikely 2.4 [1.1–5] 2.1 [1–4.2] 2.4 [1.2–5.1]
Trust in government 0.7 [0.4–1.1] 0.8 [0.5–1.4]
Knowledge of recommended behaviors 1.1 [0.7–1.8] 1 [0.6–1.6]
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Respondents in the affected counties learned about the
crisis sooner and were more likely to follow the recom-
mended behaviours. In contrast, those in the non-
affected counties, more frequently erroneously believed
that boiling or disinfecting the water was a recom-
mended behaviour. Respondents in the non-affected
areas (who were not exposed to the contaminated
water), on the other hand, were almost as likely as those
in the affected areas to believe that getting sick from
drinking the water was very likely. This suggests that
risk communication efforts worked reasonably well for
the affected population, but caused confusion in other
parts of the state.
Data from this study clearly show that a higher percep-
tion of risk and timely receipt of information are associ-
ated with compliance with recommended behaviours,
underlying the importance of releasing information to the
public as quickly as possible during a crisis. In contrast to
previous studies we did not find a difference in compli-
ance across socioeconomic levels [20–24]. Our results on
the association between risk perception and compliance
are consisted with previous studies referring to “Protection
Motivation Theory” (PMT) as a potentially useful frame-
work for understanding public response or intention to
respond to recommended health behaviours [25]. In our
study we emphasize the importance of observing actual
behaviours after a crisis and to include in such observa-
tions factors related to the response of the public health
system (i.e. time of release of information to the public) to
contextualize and better explain public behaviours and in-
form the response to future crisis. During this event, pro-
active public health strategies and a saturation of media
coverage likely resulted in a wide diffusion of information,
a study on the relationship between the use of specific
channels of information by the public and timing of the
receipt of information was beyond the purpose of this
paper.
Furthermore, the literature describes trust and cred-
ibility as critical components of effective risk communi-
cation [26–30]. In this study we limited our observation
of “trust” to generic questions on “trust in government”
which resulted not to be associated with compliance
with recommended behaviours or opinions on the role
of government in regulating the environment. We
recognize that trust is a complex construct and that our
study does not adequately describe such construct. How-
ever, this crisis seems to have exceeded the public’s toler-
ance for lack of government oversight on environmental
regulations. The fact that we found a difference in such
opinions between residents in the affected versus non-
affected counties support our hypothesis that the experi-
ence of the incident influenced their opinion on the
need for regulations; as shown by 74 % of survey respon-
dents, living in the affected areas, reporting that there is
“too little … government regulation” on the environ-
ment, a view also found to be disproportionately held by
women and those with a high perception of risk. Such
findings may be of potential interest to the policy maker.
The main limitation of this study was an underrepre-
sentation of respondents of low socio-economic pos-
ition and low educational level, which might have
limited our ability to describe behaviours and opinions
among this group. However all statistical analysis took
socio-demographics into consideration, by including
study specific post-stratification weights.
The use of a cross sectional study limited the ability to
determine public opinions and behaviours prior to the
emergency. However the fact that respondents living in
the affected counties were more likely to have an opin-
ion on the need for regulations suggests that the experi-
ence of living through the emergency influenced such
opinion. That is, the proximity of the threat influenced
their risk perceptions, and subsequent behaviours.
Conclusion
Findings from this study show that during a crisis com-
municating to the public in a timely manner affects
compliance with recommended behaviours, and that
risk-perceptions are associated with compliance. This
study also highlights the importance of coordinating risk
communication activities beyond the area of the incident
to assure public understanding of what measures are
recommended, which are not and where. Finally, results
may be of interest to the policy maker in light of the
finding that people that experienced the crisis had stron-
ger opinions on the role of government in regulating the
environment compared to those living in non-affected
areas.
Endnotes
1Boone, Cabell, Clay, Jackson, Kanawha [which includes
the city of Charleston], Lincoln, Logan, Putnam or Roane.
Abbreviation
MCHM: 4 -methylcyclohexane methanol.
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